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No Longer. Not Yet. The Promise of Labour Law  
 
David Mangan* 
 
Abstract: Since the latter part of the 20th century, economic duress has been a touchstone for changes in 
labour law. Reforms to employment tribunals in and around 2013 pose a particular challenge in access to 
redress as well as a significant obstacle to achieving the promise of labour law in the 21st century. This 
article challenges the bases for recent reforms and questions reliance on duress as their justification.  
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I. Introduction 
No longer. Not yet. These two phrases summarise the promise of English labour/employment law.1 There 
have been fleeting moments of positive steps towards employment protections. And yet, the focus of 
efforts remains to improve the present. Labour law has become a source of lament insofar as its 
contemporary form resembles little from a few decades prior and, simultaneously, offers tantalising bits 
of hope for better days. There have been a number of publications of late pronouncing a pessimistic state 
for labour law.2 This perspective originates in a view of the discipline that expects more of contemporary 
worker protections and reflects back on the 1980s as a period of tremendous decline on this account.   
  
Economic duress is a theme that runs through the collective-dominant to the individual-dominant periods 
of labour law. Complaints about economic duress (the perceived unfair influence of trade unions by way 
of industrial action) were part of the movement that brought about the decline in collective labour law in 
the 1980s. An amended form of the argument is being used again today. Illustrating the contemporary 
usage, employment tribunal procedure reforms (such as the introduction of fees for claims) passed in and 
around 2013 were premised on the idea of improving the economy (perhaps a first for economic 
                                                 
*
 I am grateful to Professor Tonia Novitz for her remarks on this work. Errors and omissions are my own. Professor 
Andrew Huxley (SOAS) passed away during the preparation of this article. His witty advice will be greatly missed.  
1
 Even the name of the discipline signifies division: where labour law is viewed as containing the historical and 
employment the more current aspects. Labour law will be used to encompass the law relating to those who engage in 
paid work; that is the law pertaining to the labour of the individual. The term includes both the collective and the 
individual: Lord Wedderburn, ‘Deregulation and Labour Law in Britain and Western Europe’ (1988-1989) 6 Hofstra 
Labor Law Journal 135, 137.  
2
 The premise of unrealised potential may be applied to the UK as well as other jurisdictions. See for example, C 
Barnard, S Deakin & GS Morris (eds), The Future of Labour Law: Liber Amicorum Bob Hepple Q.C. (Hart 
Publishing, 2004); G Davidov and B Langille (eds) The Idea of Labour Law (Oxford University Press, 2011). 
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stimulus). Threatening to continue the ‘not yet’ era of labour law, this example demonstrates how the 
imperative of commercial viability not only dictates labour regulation, but may also prove to continue the 
area’s decline. Although the hope of better days remains alive, it is in a muted form.  
 
II. No Longer 
The characterization of labour law remains an obstacle. One moment that may signal a point of no return 
to the days of greater union influence may be the foreword by then Prime Minister Tony Blair in Fairness 
at Work. He wrote: ‘There will be no going back. The days of strikes without ballots, mass picketing, 
closed shop and secondary actions are over.’3 Though a rhetorical characterisation of labour law, this 
quotation remains instructive for it conveys how labour law has been received: a discipline about 
disruption and interruption to business.  
 
The decline of the collective in labour law has been extensively engaged. These writings chart decay in 
trade unions’ role in contemporary Britain. Today, looking for positives, it may be said that unions play a 
practical role in streamlining discussions surrounding the workforce: providing employers with an 
efficient means of communicating with workers and facilitating workplace changes.4 The role measures 
the shift from the social function of labour law to a focus on its utility in supporting economic goals. Here 
is the division representing the contrast between no longer and not yet. Labour law remains, for 
employee-side practitioners and a large academic cohort, an area concerned with ‘struggle’5 amongst 
social groups. However, as defined by governments of differing political affiliations, labour law is 
conceived of as a support to economic growth.  
 
The deterioration of trade union membership (and influence),6 sitting at about 25.6% as of May 2014,7 in 
the UK ran concurrently with the rise of economic concerns becoming the guiding force in decision-
making. Unions themselves were viewed as obstacles to desired economic growth. Trade unions, it was 
alleged, had ‘abused’ their power through industrial action that harmed ‘innocent third parties’ and 
consumers.8 Legislative reforms were passed to undercut the force unions could possibly have. The 
‘traditional public policy of encouraging the spread of collective bargaining’ was found to be 
incompatible with a ‘more market-oriented analysis of economic problems’.9 This topic has been the 
subject of much discussion and will not be repeated here. It is remarkable, nevertheless, how successful 
the strategy continues to be. It tapped into something of a human bias: as a result of others, the individual 
is being held back from making progress. Trade unions became the quintessential example.  
 
                                                 
3
 Fairness at Work (CM 3968) (TSO, 1998). 
4
 The information and consultation aspects of the Trade Union and Labour Relations Consolidation Act 1992 are one 
example.  
5
 B Hepple QC, ‘Factors Influencing the Making of Labour Law’ in G Davidov and B Langille (eds) The Idea of 
Labour Law (Oxford University Press, 2011) 30-42, 42. 
6
 The high water mark was 1979 when there were 13 million members. From 1980 to the mid-1990s there was a 
steady decline in membership. Since that time, the percentage of the unionised workforce has largely shrunk (though 
it increased in 2010-2011) and sits at about 6.5 million, a drop of 6,000 members or .1%: BIS, Trade Union 
Membership 2013 (2014) [Trade Union Membership 2013], 5.  
7
 ‘This is the lowest rate of trade union membership recorded between 1995 and 2013. Over this period, the 
proportion of employees who were trade union members in the UK has decreased around 7 percentage points, from 
32.4 per cent in 1995’: Trade Union Membership 2013 (n 6) 5. It should be noted that there has been an increase in 
membership in the private sector, as of May 2014, to about 2.6 million members.  
8
 B Simpson, ‘British Labour Relations in the 1980s: Learning to Live with the Law’ (1986) 49 Modern Law Review 
796, 810. 
9
 Ibid, 800, where Simpson’s review cited P Davies and M Freedland, Kahn-Freund’s Labour and the Law (Stevens, 
3rd edn1983). 
 3 
Democratizing trade unions was another touchstone. Looking back, democratization arguments were the 
precursor to individualistic aims. The increasing role of government in labour relations regulation has 
lead to the pre-eminence of the individual contract of employment as the embodiment of mutual 
obligations between employer and worker; a setting described as encouraging ‘forms of marginal 
employment which are subject to a minimum of protective rights for workers, as well as direct erosion … 
of rights’.10 Criticism remains non-partisan, extending beyond the Conservatives of the 1980s. Noting the 
‘public relations verbiage’ found in Fairness at Work, one may point to the then-newly elected Labour 
party’s document as lacking ‘the necessary commitment to collective bargaining as an “industrial 
relations good”’.11 Despite the addition of a national minimum wage, one commentator wrote with 
dismay of Labour’s continuation of the economic foundation for employment regulation: the minimum 
wage ‘is heavily qualified by the government’s evident deference to the view that social rights for 
workers are a part of employers’ labour costs which must be minimised in the interests of maintaining 
their ability to compete in increasingly global markets’.12 
 
In assessing the decline of collective laissez-faire in the 1980s, Professor Collins characterised the period 
as a ‘productive disintegration’.13 He applauded Professors Davies and Freedland14 for providing a means 
to engage with the individual rights of employment law. Furthermore and most prominently, the 1980s 
legislation should be viewed not as ‘a blunt attack on collective bargaining and trade unions, but a new 
anti-inflation strategy.’15 The conclusion: labour law must be situated within the context of macro-
economic policies.16 Now, economic policy dominates discussions. The move to a macro-economic focus 
has compelled consideration of the workforce as part of one grouping (collective) – the workforce of the 
company that is England competing amongst global entities. From this notion key terms such as 
efficiency and productivity originate. It has been asserted that the ‘collectivist interpretation of the system 
of industrial relations’ has been unreceptive to considerations of individual rights.17 And yet, nuance 
appears to be the key point: collectivists were highly suspicious of an individualist system that had 
freedom to contract as its underlying ethos.18 This concern, retrospectively, was not unfounded. The 
greater success achieved by trade unions in relation to employment protections must be a testament to the 
power of the collective over that of the individual. Usurpation of individual rights was not the aim. 
Instead the collective was the better strategy to achieve the end goal of greater employment protection and 
increased remuneration packages (whether that be monetary gains or other improvements). And still, the 
success of collectives was eschewed because it was perceived to have come at the expense of the 
country’s economic strength.  
 
The judiciary played an integral role in the encompassing force of the term economic duress. It did not 
accept that there could be ‘an area of legitimate industrial conflict within which the restraints of the 
common law should not apply’19 ‘Privileges’20 (language employed by Friedrich von Hayek) has been 
                                                 
10
 Ibid, 816. 
11
 B Simpson, Fairness at Work (1998) 27 Industrial Law Journal 245, 248.  
12
 Ibid, 252. 
13
 H Collins, ‘The Productive Disintegration of Labour Law’ (1997), 26 Industrial Law Journal 295, 303. 
14
 P Davies and M Freedland, ‘Labour Law and the Public Interest – Collective Bargaining and Economic Policy’ in 
Lord Wedderburn and W.T. Murphy (eds), Labour Law and the Community: Perspectives of the 1980s (Institute of 
Advanced Legal Studies, 1982) 13, 14.  
15
 Collins (n.13) 303. 
16
 Ibid. 
17
 Ibid, 304. 
18
 Beyond legislation, the ‘residue’ of English law is the common law and its premise of freedom of contract 
separates British labour law from other systems: Wedderburn (n 1) 137. 
19
 B Simpson, ‘A Not So Golden Formula: In Contemplation or Furtherance of a Trade Dispute After 1982’ (1983) 
46 Modern Law Review 463, 465. 
20
 Ibid, 466. 
 4 
aptly used as a descriptor of what unions sought according to the judiciary: trade unions were seeking 
privileged status to undertake activities which the economic minds of the judiciary deemed harmful. The 
House of Lords’ decision in Universe Tankships Inc. of Monrovia v International Transport Workers 
Federation21 offered a convenient illustration. The case concerned the Federation’s campaign to ‘black-
flag’ ships flying ‘flags of convenience’; a means for ship-owners to avoid employment protections for 
crewmembers. The court refused to look at this as a case pertaining to the terms and conditions of 
employment for seafarers; that is as a labour dispute (the golden formula being inapplicable).22 The 
Federation conceded that its campaign constituted economic duress. In essence, the concession was that 
the Federation’s work to protect members fell afoul of one of the few limitations English contract law 
imposes upon parties.23 The concession remains important because duress requires particular facts to 
establish the case. Furthermore, duress claims can often become mixed in with arguments (often made by 
the academic community) regarding a need for good faith in English contract law; something of a hotly 
contested area to which no resolution seems foreseeable.24 
 
Viewing labour law history as a story of the collective and individual periods, the latter being the present, 
duress is a common touchstone for economic interests. In the collective era, duress (particularly economic 
duress) was a sort of rallying call against trade unions. Putting the concession in Universe Tankships 
aside, Lord Wedderburn reminded it was ‘inevitable’25 that economic duress would enter into the labour 
law discussion because coercion is at the heart of contracts of employment: ‘The individual worker who 
accepts engagement rather than starve or who obeys an employer’s orders rather than be dismissed into 
unemployment is not normally understood by lawyers to have suffered from “economic duress” (though 
his will was surely “overborne”).’26 Coercion is contract negotiation if we are to follow the comments in a 
leading decision: ‘Illegitimate pressure must be distinguished from the rough and tumble of the pressures 
of normal commercial bargaining.’27  
 
With the 1980s, England embraced the argument of duress in order to tame the influence of unions. 
Further into the twenty-first century, duress arguments persist. They have moved away from trade 
unions.28 The durability of the duress argument should be appreciated because, agree or disagree, it 
remains a remarkably influential premise; facilitating a change that sees workers (employment regulation 
of individual workers) replacing trade unions as the anchor of the economy.   
 
                                                 
21
 [1982] 2 WLR 803 [Universe Tankships]. 
22
 Simpson noted the uncertainty as to what the court was saying in Universe Tankships: Simpson (n 19), 468. 
23
 Duress (along with misrepresentation and undue influence) remains a concept to which the English common law 
points when it is criticised for having no duty of good faith.  
24
 Some momentum to the argument for good faith obligations in English contract law has arisen from the decision 
in Yam Seng Ptd Ltd v International Trade Corporation Ltd. [2013] EWHC 111 (QB) and commentaries derived 
therefrom such as H Collins, ‘Implied Terms: The Foundation in Good Faith and Fair Dealing’ (2014) 67 Current 
Legal Problems 297 and D Campbell, ‘Good Faith and the Ubiquity of the “Relational Contract”’ (2014) 77 Modern 
Law Review 460. Professor Douglas Brodie – D Brodie, ‘How Relational Is the Employment Contract?’ (2011) 40 
Industrial Law Journal 232 – has doubted the viability of the intersection between relational contracts (per Macneil) 
and UK employment law. For some time Professor McKendrick has argued against adoption of relational contracts 
in the UK: E McKendrick, ‘Long-term Contracts in English Law’ in J Beatson & D Friedmann (eds), Good Faith 
and Fault in English Law (Clarendon Press, 1995), 305. 
25
 Lord Wedderburn, ‘Economic Duress’ (1982) 45 Modern Law Review 556, 560. 
26
 Ibid. 
27
 DSND Subsea Ltd v. Petroleum Geo-Services ASA [2000] BLR 530, [131].  
28
 The wage premium (the difference in pay between unionised and non-unionised workers) has declined since 1995 
to the point that the ‘trade union wage premium for public sector workers was 10.5 percentage points lower in 2013 
compared with 1995, while for the private sector, this was 8.3 percentage points lower over the same period’: Trade 
Union Membership 2013 (n 6) 9. 
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III. Not Yet 
Employment regulation has once again been viewed as a problem and again economic duress has 
underpinned the argument for reform. Now, it is not the legal concept taken from contract law but the 
phrase in a non-legal sense. Individual workers present economic problems. First, workers may too easily 
launch an employment claim. Once claims are made employers incur costs.29 Surveys of employers are 
used to evidence the assertions. Consider the following: 67% of employers believe employment 
regulation is a barrier to the UK’s market competitiveness; 34% of claims are withdrawn by applicants; 
employers are four times more likely to win but 26% are still settling even when told they can win.30 
Second, low productivity levels in the UK obstruct economic development. Private sector per hour labour 
productivity was at about 8% below its pre-crisis peak as of August 2013,31 but it has risen by 1.7% more 
than expected since the recession.32 The measurement is based on comparison with the highpoint of 2007 
Quarter 4 figures.33 And yet, labour law has been an area in which belief has often trumped evidence.34 
Preceding the recession of 2008/2009, the 2007 Q4 comparator must be challenged as it represented a 
peak in a questioned framework.35 The danger in looking at the predicament as one of low labour 
productivity is that it easily falls into a theme that in England has a long history – worker lethargy and its 
associated ills. The outlook ignores that both productivity and wages over the last 40 years have increased 
and ONS data from July 2014 shows that productivity has surpassed real wages (keeping in mind a figure 
of 87% inflation during that period).36 This fall has been pointed to as an explanation for why UK 
employment was not more greatly affected during the recession.37 It also overlooks how workers during 
The Great Recession, according to the Governor of the Bank of England, seemed to have ‘effectively 
priced themselves into low-productivity work at a time of weak demand.’38 This is not to cast aside 
positives. For example, lower wages may have contributed to keeping employment levels higher during 
trying economic times. As well, maintaining some level of employment helps workers retain and develop 
new skills.39 Still, the lower productivity figure precipitated concerns which the Government believed 
must be solved through these measures.   
 
Given the aforementioned situation, are there prospects for labour law to fulfil a promise of improvements 
for workers? Recent circumstances suggest new obstacles in the way of such realization. The genesis of 
these new challenges is a focus on small to medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) as the motivation for 
                                                 
29
 E Jordan, A Thomas & J Kitching, R Blackburn, ‘Part A: Employer perceptions and the impact of employment 
regulation’ Employment Relations Research Series 123 (BIS, March 2013) [Jordan et al], 18. These are not new 
assertions. For example, Lord Jones in the course of debates on the Employment Act 2008 identified abuses by 
workers: Hansard HL, Vol 699, colGC74 (25 February 2008). 
30
 Facing the Future: CBI/Harvey Nash Employment Trends Survey2012 (2012), 25-26. This publication is used as 
an example of supporting surveys. 
31
 Bank of England, Inflation Report August 2013 [Inflation Report August 2013], 26. 
32
 Bank of England, Inflation Report November 2014, 33. 
33
 N Oulton & M Sebastia-Barriel, ‘Long and short-term effects of the financial crisis on labour productivity, capital 
and output’ (Bank of England Working Paper No.470) (2013). 
34
 For an elaboration of this critique, see S Slinn, ‘The Limitations of Pieces of Paper: A Role for Social Science in 
Labour Law’ (2006) 12 Canadian Labour and Employment Law Journal 291.  
35
 The Bank of England questioned the sustainability of the financial services sector’s productivity prior to the 
recession: Inflation Report August 2013 (n 31).  
36
 Office for National Statistics, UK Wages Over the Past Four Decades – 2014. WERS 2011 has also noted a fall in 
real terms of average earnings. The recession, however, does not explain away a troubling trend.  
37
 B van Wanrooy, H Bewley, A Bryson, J Forth, S Freeth, L Stokes & S Wood, The 2011 Workplace Employment 
Relations Study: First Findings (BIS, 2013) [WERS 2011], 121. 
38
 Bank of England, ‘Remarks by given by Mark Carney, Governor of the Bank of England’ Davos CBI British 
Business Leaders Lunch (24 January 2014), 7. 
39
 Ibid, 8. 
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employment regulation. (SMEs are employing enterprises with between 1 and 249 workers.)40 In the UK, 
BIS business plans contain priorities which engage with SMEs. In particular, the following priorities are 
particularly resonant: Markets – where part of the plan is to create a positive business environment by 
‘implementing reforms to the BIS employment laws framework, working with other Departments to 
support a fair, effective and efficient labour market’.41  
 
The UK shares this focus on SMEs with the European Commission (EC). The EC has emphasised the 
importance of work to support SMEs with the aim of creating growth champions within the jurisdiction.42 
In 2008, the Small Business Act was introduced to foster entrepreneurship for SMEs who were poised to 
take advantage of globalisation. There was a sense of frustrated urgency at that time: for example one of 
the headings was entitled ‘Time for a Breakthrough’. ‘Red tape’ anchored SMEs’ progression into 
stronger, larger businesses. Entrepreneurs were also a group of concern in Think Small First. It seems as 
though continuing efforts to support the SME cohort have been identified. More recently, the 
Commission has devised COSME,43 ‘the EU programme for the Competitiveness of Enterprises and 
Small and Medium-sized Enterprises (SMEs) running from 2014 to 2020 with a planned budget of 
€2.3bn.’44 COSME is overseen by the Executive Agency for Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises 
(EASME).45  
 
A. Employment Tribunal Reforms: not yet becomes if ever?   
Against the backdrop of fostering small to medium-sized enterprises, the changes to English employment 
tribunal procedure have been premised on the notion workers launch scores of frivolous employment 
claims. These actions create business expenses, thereby draining the English economy. It must be a 
remarkable time when overhaul of employment tribunal procedure is viewed as a way to improve a 
country’s economy. Underlining the role of labour law as a support to economic growth, an overarching 
aim of the Coalition Government’s Employment Law Review was ‘to address the reality that businesses 
see that the cost and complexity of employment laws impact on their ability to take on staff and grow.’46  
 
                                                 
40
 SMEs consist of three sub-groups: micros (1-9 employees); small (10-49 employees); and medium (50-249 
employees). This is the breakdown used by the European Commission following EU recommendation 2003/361. 
41
 This ‘Market’ priority is drawn from the BIS Business Plan 2012-2015 (2012). Other priorities are also relevant 
(for example Skills – Build and internationally competitive skills base and promote more opportunities for 
individuals in realising their potential; ; Enterprise – Boost enterprise and make this the decade of the entrepreneur. 
Under this action, BIS has been planning to ‘recruit and train 15,000 mentors (5000 funded by the Government 
Equalities Office) to provide additional mentoring capacity for SMEs.’).   
42
 See for example European Commission, ‘Communication from the Commission to the Council, The European 
Parliament, The European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions’ COM (2008) 394 
Final (25 June 2008), 2, where it was written: ‘capacity to build on the growth and innovation potential of small and 
medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) will therefore be decisive for the future prosperity of the EU.’ 
43
 Established by EU Regulation 1287/2013 (11 December 2013). 
44
 Art.5 of EU Regulation 1287/2013 contains an outline of how the budget is to be spent. 
45
 http://ec.europa.eu/easme/index_en.htm (last accessed: 9 January 2015). Of the four categories of objectives in 
COSME, employment regulation efforts seem to fit best under the third, ‘improving framework conditions for the 
competitiveness and sustainability of Union enterprises, particularly SMEs, including in the tourism sector’; though 
the fourth objective also has application (‘promoting entrepreneurship and entrepreneurial culture’). EU 
Commission, ‘ANNEX to the Commission Implementing Decision concerning the adoption of the work programme 
for 2014 and the financing for the implementation of Programme for the Competitiveness of Enterprises and small 
and medium-sized enterprises’ C (2014) 247 Final. These are also found in Art.4 (1)(c),(d) of EU Regulation 
1287/2013. 
46
 BIS, ‘Employment Law Review Annual Update 2012’, 6. The Government claims that these changes will save 
businesses £40 million per year. 
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The Coalition picked up the mantle from the John Major Conservative Government through the changes 
brought in by the Enterprise and Regulatory Reform Act 2013, Part 247 as well as the Employment 
Tribunals (Constitution and Rules of Procedure) Regulations 2013.48 The Green Paper of the Major 
Conservative Government Resolving Employment Rights Disputes – Options for Reform expressed 
concern over industrial tribunals offering ‘a readily accessible and cost effective means of redress’.49 The 
2013 package may assist employers, but more remarkable was the Government’s ambivalence regarding 
employment protections. These reforms put into question access to redress for potential infringements of 
employment rights and, most significantly, tilted the balance more clearly towards economic stimulation 
rather than rights protection. In effect, the package of reforms instituted a plan of organic dissuasion of 
redress as an economic strategy.   
 
(a) Financialising tribunal claims 
The centrepiece of the reforms was costs.50 The Employment Tribunals and the Employment Appeal 
Tribunal Fees Order 201351 introduced fees for bringing an employment claim for the first time since the 
industrial tribunals were established by the Industrial Training Act 1964. These monies had already been 
allocated to offset some of the planned 23% budget reduction over four years (beginning in 2011).52 The 
Government expected to recover approximately 33% of the cost of employment tribunal proceedings 
through these fees.53 Figures for 2013-2014 show that the Government spent £76.4 million on 
employment tribunal business and recouped £4.5 million (net) in fees (6% of expenditure).54 These fees 
underscore how employment regulation has been imbued with an economic imperative. 
 
The most difficult measurement is also the most important: the impact on employment adjudication. Two 
circumstances are foreseeable: a decrease in the number of claims and a rise in the number of self-
represented claimants. At its core, the notion that fees will result in a decrease in claims asks the question: 
does employment regulation impact on practice in the area? The answer is, it does. The Unfair Dismissal 
and Statement of Reasons for Dismissal (Variation of Qualifying Period) Order 2012,55 which doubled the 
qualification period for unfair dismissal from one to two years,56 confirms the impact of employment 
regulation. Unfair dismissal claims fell from 50% in 2008 down to 33% of total claims in 2013. Payment 
of Tribunal Awards,57 from which this data was obtained, looked at claims between September 2011 and 
November 2012. The Order came into effect on 6 April 2012 which may have resulted in an increase in 
the number of claims just prior to this date (an occurrence witnessed just before the 29 July 2013 coming 
into force date of the Employment Tribunals and the Employment Appeal Tribunal Fees Order 2013).58 
The noted decrease in unfair dismissal claims is suggestive of a similar drop in the overall number of 
                                                 
47
 2013 Chapter 24. Royal Assent 25 April 2013 [ERRA]. 
48
 SI 2013 No 1237 (in force as of July 2013)[2013 Regulations]. 
49
 Employment Department, Resolving Employment Rights Disputes – Options for Reform (Cm 2707, 1994), [1.2]. 
50
 My gratitude to David Renton of Garden Court Chambers for his observations regarding this part. 
51
 SI 2013/1893 (in force 29 July 2013). For details of the fee scheme see, D Pyper & F McGuiness, Employment 
Tribunal Fees SN 07081 (House of Commons Library) 2015, 5-8.   
52
 BIS, Resolving workplace disputes: A consultation (2011) [Resolving workplace disputes], 49. 
53
 See Employment Tribunal and Employment Appeal Tribunal Fees Stakeholder factsheet 
http://www.justice.gov.uk/downloads/tribunals/employment/et-fees-factsheet.pdf (last accessed: 9 January 2015). 
Recall many workers found completing the preceding version of ET1 forms for claims to be a ‘daunting experience’: 
N Busby & M McDermont, ‘Workers, Marginalised Voices and the Employment Tribunal System: Some 
Preliminary Findings’ (2012) 41 Industrial Law Journal 166, 175. 
54
 Pyper & McGuiness, 13. 
55
 SI 2012/989. 
56
 Ewing and Hendy have questioned the reason for the increase in the qualification period: K Ewing & J Hendy 
‘Unfair Dismissal Law Changes – Unfair?’ (2012) 41 Industrial Law Journal 115, 116. 
57
 IFF Research, Payment of Tribunal Awards (BIS, 2013) [Payment of Tribunal Awards]. 
58
 SI 2013/1893. 
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claims with respect to the influence of the Tribunal Fees Order. A drop was predicted as a result of the 
introduction of fees.59 Early data suggested there has been a significant decrease. Mr. Justice Langstaff 
identified a decrease in applications of one-third in his 2014 report.60 Data from September 2014 denoted 
a drop of 70% in single claims and multiple claims fell from 1500 in April-June 2013 to 500 in the same 
period in 2014.61 Receipts of claims at the employment tribunal fell from an average of 48,000 new 
claims per quarter to 8540 new claims in the period April to June 2014.62 These figures have arisen 
despite the possibility of reimbursement being ordered by tribunals for successful claimants.63 At its most 
generous, it may be said that the dramatic drop in employment claims since the introduction of the fees 
scheme had a deterrent effect.64 The consequence of fewer cases poses some troubling potential for the 
growth of caselaw in the area. The last monumental development at common law was the mutual 
obligation of trust and confidence. It will remain in question whether fees reduce the probability of 
developments in the discipline.   
 
Tribunal fees have been challenged by Unison but as yet the union has not been successful. At a first 
hearing,65 the court found the matter to be premature.66 The Government’s submission included the 
following argument:  
‘The Court was treated to lengthy citation on behalf of the Lord Chancellor of a Hansard 
report of debate when the Order was introduced, in which the Minister disavowed any 
intention to deter individuals from bringing a claim. She emphasised the need to reduce what 
she described as "an inordinate number of claims" which are "long-winded, expensive, 
protracted and emotionally draining disputes…certainly not in the interests of individuals or 
of business".’67  
This statement would appear to be an example of indirect effect where the Government contended its 
direct intention was to address the number of claims, but change also deterred individuals from initiating 
claims. Later in 2014, the matter again reached the Administrative Court as Unison argued it now had the 
evidence (largely focusing on the costs as they affect impoverished claimants68 within the EU framework) 
                                                 
59
 Underhill J. recorded opposition to the introduction of fees, calling it a ‘powerful disincentive’ to bringing a 
claim: Fundamental Review of Employment Tribunal Rules (2012), [10].  
60
 Senior President of Tribunals’ Annual Report 2014 (London: 2014) [Senior President Report], 63. 
61
 Ministry of Justice, Tribunal Statistics Quarterly April – June 2014, 8 
62
 Ibid, 25. Published figures differ depending on the period assessed and the breakdown of the numbers (for 
example single versus multiple claims). Her Majesty’s Courts & Tribunal Service (HMCTS), Employment tribunal 
fees for individuals T435 (2013), 9, is one example. 
63
 HMCTS stated at the time tribunal fees came into effect – ‘The general position is that, if you are successful, the 
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 9 
the court found wanting in the earlier decision.69 Again the claim failed based on the absence of specific 
facts70 and evidence suggesting there was a burden on, as opposed to a choice for, claimants to make.71 
Professor Novitz has queried what evidence would be satisfactory to establish that fees have deterred 
litigants. The paradox of these cases is that if litigants come to the court as a result of this type of 
challenge they have the support of a trade union. There is much to be said about the interpretation of 
choice in this context.   
 
Observers of English labour law will note the increasing reference to relevant Canadian case law in 
English academic commentaries and again there is occasion here. The Supreme Court of Canada dealt 
with the issue of trial hearing fees in Trial Lawyers Association of British Columbia v British Columbia 
(Attorney General).72 The facts, briefly, were that the claimant was a qualified veterinary surgeon (not 
working at the time) from Europe who was involved in a custody dispute. The Province of British 
Columbia started hearing fees with the aim of establishing a revenue neutral trial service.73 For the 
claimant’s case, the hearing fee was about $3600 to be paid in advance of the hearing (neither party was 
represented by a lawyer). This figure was equivalent to the net family income. Legal fees leading up to 
the hearing left savings depleted. The claimant did not qualify for fee remission (fee waiver). The 
Supreme Court ruled that the claimant was exempt from the fee and found the fee scheme 
unconstitutional. It was left to the Legislature to address points raised in the decision. In comparison to 
the English decisions, the comments from the Canadian Supreme Court recalls Unison’s position: ‘If 
people cannot bring legitimate issues to court, the creation and maintenance of positive laws will be 
hampered, as laws will not be given effect.’74 The idea of exemptions for the impoverished had been a 
focal point to the challenge in England, the topic only touched on a prescient point: ‘…providing 
exemptions to the truly impoverished may set the access bar too high. A fee that is so high that it requires 
litigants who are not impoverished to sacrifice reasonable expenses in order to bring a claim may, absent 
adequate exemptions, be unconstitutional because it subjects litigants to undue hardship, thereby 
effectively depriving access to the courts.’75 This is not a matter considered by the court in either of the 
Unison challenges and yet perceiving of tribunal fees as only being about the ‘poor’ misses the breadth of 
this profound issue. 
 
The Coalition’s employment regulation reforms also pose a profound challenge to the practice of worker-
side employment law. As alluded to above, there is likely to be less work for this cohort of solicitors and 
barristers because of the financial disincentive. Moreover, a further consequence of fees is that those who 
wish to pursue claims may well do so on their own, depending on the case. For example, data from 
Payment of Tribunal Awards76 reveals 67% of claimants were likely to seek assistance for an unfair 
dismissal claim and 57% sought assistance from solicitors.77 And yet for wage claims, claimants were 
more likely to access free advice through the Citizens Advice Bureau (30%) or Acas (12%).78 Overall, 
only 42% of claimants had sought advice from legal professionals. 25% of claimants sought advice from 
the Citizens’ Advice Bureau, while 19% used family and friends’ assistance. The prospect for self-
                                                 
69
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 Ibid, [62], [98]. 
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 Ibid, [61].  
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representation is readily apparent to those working in employment law.79 Self-representation means 
greater demands on resources dependent on government funding which as yet do not seem to be 
increasing in concert with any foreseeable increase in use. More profoundly, tribunals will be placed in 
the unenviable position of weighing the fact of self-representation and ensuring fairness for those 
individuals during proceedings.80 Sadly, circumstances appear to have changed little if practice evolves in 
this manner. The reforms are premised on cost certainty for employers so that the overall numbers are 
reduced thereby presenting a cost saving through employment regulation.   
 
As is the case with labour law, there is always a sliver of positive. A recent report in the workplace 
defined contribution pension scheme offered some intriguing points. Though early in its development, 
this pension scheme ties into the present discussion insofar as it presents some arguments contrary to 
recent labour law trends. In the Regulatory Policy Committee’s Impact Assessment,81 the problem to 
which the scheme was aimed was couched within the Office of Fair Trading’s defined contribution (DC) 
market study82 which ‘found that competition alone cannot be relied upon to drive value for money in the 
DC workplace pension market due to weaknesses in the buyer side of the market and the complexity of 
the product. Government intervention is necessary to ensure all individuals saving into a workplace 
pension get value for money.’83 The laissez-faire ethos is put aside here. Even competition is discounted: 
government intervention is needed because ‘competition alone’ will not achieve the desired results. 
Workplace pensions carry forward a trend of the twenty-first century, downloading responsibility. 
Pensions are so important, however, the government is willing to add cost (often called a burden in the 
labour context) to private sector employers.84 This is a noteworthy development as there is a connection 
being drawn between government (reductions in) spending and protection of defined contribution pension 
remuneration packages for private sector workers.  
 
(b) Coercion as dispute resolution 
If claims are initiated, then they are to be dealt with swiftly. If the claimant brings forward a claim, the 
required forms now state median awards.85 These figures are lower and more representative (£4560) than 
the average awards (£9133), themselves buoyed by a few larger sums.86 Figures from the first few months 
of early conciliation show 17,145 notifications (of which 540 were by an employer and the remainder by 
a worker). 
 
With the changes, the expectation is that many cases be disposed of through the early conciliation 
process.87 At the outset and before a hearing, workers (‘prospective claimants’) must report their claims 
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 Ministry of Justice, ‘Employment Tribunals and EAT Statistics, 2011-12 (1 April 2011 to 31 March 2012) (2012). 
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details to Acas.88 The prospective claimant is to complete a form (online or sent by post) or must call 
Acas.89 The timeline is up to ‘one calendar month starting on the date of receipt of the form (or call to 
Acas)’.90 During the prescribed period, a conciliation officer ‘shall … endeavour to promote a settlement 
between the persons who would be parties to the proceedings’. This is achieved by Acas making attempts 
to contact the prospective claimant and, if consent is given, the prospective respondent.91 If contact is not 
made, Acas ‘must conclude that settlement is not possible.’92 If settlement is not possible or the period 
expires, the prospective claimant must obtain a certificate confirming the close of the prescribed period.93 
Still, Acas conciliation is not mandatory (either party can refuse).94  
 
Mandatory consultation finds its basis in the idea of costs. Since fewer than one third of claimants sought 
out Acas, the Government speculated this body could reduce the number of claims reaching the tribunal 
stage by 12,000.95 Early figures from Acas show 7% of workers and 9% of employers (where the worker 
agreed) opted out of early conciliation.96 Acas updated these figures were updated cumulatively and so 
data includes the period from April to September 2014, finding 10% rejected conciliation.97 
 
Mandating Acas be involved delays expenditure by employers and also means the claims may potentially 
be averted. Data from Acas indicates some impact (though it is difficult to determine its significance at 
this point) of the early conciliation process. Of the 11,355 cases that ended their early conciliation period 
in the period April – June 2014, 1,873 cases reached settlement (called COT3) which was 16.5% of the 
total.98 The only other data available found 19% of those who went through conciliation without 
settlement decided to abandon the claim;99 though there was no indication as to why this decision was 
taken. Acas’ update on these figures was cumulative and did not separate findings from the previous 
release.100 And so, data covered the period April to September 2014, 17,162 cases in total. Of these 18% 
reached COT3 (3,046); 24% proceeded to Tribunal (4,198); and 58% (9,918) did not proceed. For those 
who suggested that many frivolous claims are launched, the 58% of claims that do not proceed may be 
viewed as vindication. However, Acas remains unclear as to the reasons for abandonment. Here will be a 
lingering question: how many cases will move to the tribunal stage and for what reasons will cases be 
abandoned? Tracking all of this information will be quite important to an overall assessment of the 
effectiveness of early conciliation.  
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If the claim continues past conciliation, the second tier of dispute resolution is the settlement offer. The 
amendments to the established settlement offers stand out as a means of incentivising the early resolution 
of disputes.101 While it may be said the Government subscribed to Gibbons’ suggestion of early resolution 
of disputes (notably at an informal stage),102 its perspective on early resolution would appear to focus on 
the benefits for one side. Section 111A of the Employment Rights Act 1996 is an example. While 
settlement negotiations remain inadmissible at tribunal,103 the Act now provides a way for ‘improper 
behaviour’104 to be put before the tribunal:    
(4)In relation to anything said or done which in the tribunal’s opinion was improper, or was 
connected with improper behaviour, subsection (1) applies only to the extent that the tribunal 
considers just.  
(5)Subsection (1) does not affect the admissibility, on any question as to costs or expenses, of 
evidence relating to an offer made on the basis that the right to refer to it on any such question is 
reserved. 
The identified objectives behind a finding of impropriety are of importance because this behaviour is the 
benchmark for the admissibility of settlement negotiations:105  
we envisage a scheme requiring or empowering an employment tribunal to increase or 
decrease the amount of any financial compensation which is ultimately awarded where 
parties have made an offer of settlement which has not reasonably been accepted. 
Wherever no award is made (i.e. the claim is lost), and a reasonable offer of settlement has 
been made to the claimant we envisage that such a fact could be used by a tribunal in 
considering whether the claimant had pursued the case “vexatiously, abusively, 
disruptively or otherwise unreasonably”, or in a way that was “misconceived”.106 
Concerns about improper behaviour and the vexatious suggest that the aim is more about dispensing with 
claims.107 If an offer is not accepted and the claim is lost, the Government has enacted a measure that may 
punish a losing party.108 The focus on boosting the economy places the emphasis with regards to 
settlement offers on the disposal of claims so as to protect the financial resources of companies.   
 
To call these changes a commitment to ADR would be a disservice to ADR. Instead, this system of 
dispute resolution is more in the line of coerced conflict resolution. From the forms claimants are to fill 
out (which inform of median awards figures) to claimants’ obligation to report claims to Acas first, 
procedure is tailored to put the emphasis on claimants and keep it there. Employment claims (moving 
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forward) will be a war of attrition which workers are not well equipped to survive. There are built-in steps 
that (using the gambling analogy common amongst critics of employment protections) make employment 
actions a poor bet despite the hand one may have.  
 
B. The Unproductive Weakening of Employment Law 
The Coalition Government reforms have weakened employment law and arguably challenged 
innovation/growth. These developments stifle productive innovation when it comes to managing 
personnel because so much has been done to eliminate concerns about workforce management: problems 
are fixed by relaxed employment regulation and so decisions about the workforce garner less than a 
productive amount of attention. To be clear, this argument is not a generalisation of English enterprise. 
Instead, as happens too often with blunt one-size fits all reforms, those who are engaged in good practices 
which usefully maximise human resources are insufficiently recognised because attention is diverted to 
those less than stellar examples. The argument here is that the foundations of the reforms are more of a 
quicksand than solid ground.  
 
As a motivation, facilitating growth for small to medium-sized businesses is an understandable strategy. 
According to 2013 statistics from BIS, small to medium-sized firms accounted for a combined 59.3% of 
UK private sector employment and they constituted about 99.9% of private sector businesses.109 Between 
2000 and 2013 SMEs have grown rapidly, increasing in number by about 41% during that period.110 
Given this figure, it is comprehensible why the Government’s current plan for employment regulation 
focuses more squarely on this group. 68% of claims were made against this cohort: 33% of claimants filed 
cases against employers with 1 to 9 employees; 35% against employers employing between 10 and 49 
workers; 11% against undertakings with 50 to 249 workers.111And yet, there is reason to raise questions. 
In the SME Business Barometer February 2014,112 SME employers were asked (based on a list read to 
them) which represented an obstacle to the success of their businesses. 62% identified the economy 
(which was 10% less than the June 2013 figure). 49% cited taxation. 21% identified staff recruitment 
(though what this term refers to is unclear) and this was up from 16% in June 2013. By using SMEs as a 
target group the aims of employment regulation have shifted to that of an easy-to-use format where the 
ease in engaging workers (with minimal regulatory considerations) is facilitated. The reform package 
charts a retrenchment of the parameters for access to redress which has the potential to limit the 
enforcement of recognised employment rights, especially when determined by their impact on business.  
 
Several considerations suggest that this cohort is a quicksand upon which to premise such significant 
regulation. First, SMEs prefer to have an informal workplace;113 that is, few if any formal written 
policies.114 Gibbons wrote that small businesses preferred the informal workplace because expressing 
‘problems in writing can act as a trigger for greater conflict’.115 
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Consequently, and second, this choice exposes them to greater potential liability at employment tribunals 
for the absence of formal procedures. A large number of workers in businesses of between 5 and 9 were 
highly likely to have a positive view of the workplace.116 Despite this, empirical evidence underlined the 
accompanying risk: ‘Wider research has shown that small employers are more likely to be involved in, 
and lose, employment tribunals, particularly those that did not follow formal processes when dealing with 
disputes’.117 The reason for loss at the Employment Tribunal was not singularly attributable to the 
absence of human resources support118 because the application of procedures ‘makes the difference 
between winning or losing a case’.119  
 
Third, while SMEs are the fastest growing entity in the private sector, much of that growth is the result of 
increases in the number of businesses with no employees.120 BIS speculated that ‘tough labour market 
conditions … may have encouraged people to set up in business as they are made redundant.’121 Office of 
National Statistics data suggested 15% of the total workforce were self-employed in 2014.122 Based on 
BIS’ Business Population 2013, the number of businesses that employ individuals currently sits at 
100,000 more in 2013 than in 2000. This is quite a modest increase. There has been a movement from 
large entities (250 plus workers) to smaller, sole proprietor enterprises: at the start of 2013, 28.5% of 
private sector businesses were companies while 62.6% were sole proprietorships (of which only 9% 
employ anyone). (There was a small increase (2.2%) in large businesses between 2012 and 2013.) 
Employment since 2008 has ‘predominantly’ increased as a result of self-employment.123 For example, 
between the first quarter 2008 and the second quarter 2014, employment rose by 1.1 million, but of that 
732,000 were self-employed.124 There is a curious duality evident. Regulation is being undertaken in 
favour of the cohort. However, translation into increased employment is not arising. 22% of SMEs 
employed fewer people by February 2014 than they did by February 2013. Only 18% employed more 
workers. Surveys in February and June 2013 (immediately after extending the qualifying period for unfair 
dismissal protection from one to two years) show that 19% and 12% (respectively) hired more workers 
than in the previous 12-month period. In the same period, 21% and 28% (respectively) had fewer 
workers. It may be reasonable to assume SMEs need to feel secure before they hire. And yet, indications 
are that SMEs have a positive mind-set: 74% made a profit in the previous 12-month period; 85% expect 
to make a profit in the next 12 month period; 66% aim to grow their business in the next 2-3 years. 
Overall there was a rise (13%) in the number of respondents who increased their profit from one-year 
prior and 36% of SMEs improved their turnover (the largest 12-month increase in the Barometer’s history 
dating back to 2008). In the next 12-month period, only 23% indicated they would employ more people 
versus 68% who would remain at status quo. In fact, the ‘proportion of SME employers employing fewer 
has been higher than those employing more in every Barometer.’125 
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Fourth, another difficulty with regulating to the benefit of the SME cohort is they are most likely to be 
unaware of the assistance being provided to them.126 The report of Jordan et al identified this curiosity: 
‘There was no evidence that these employers were aware of the increased qualifying period for unfair 
dismissal’.127 SMEs’ anxiety has driven these changes and yet that anxiety will remain.128 The difficulty 
here lies not in regulation but in informing a reluctant group. SMEs’ inflated sense of risk in the absence 
of accurate information (and one could add reinforcing such an attitude by legislating based on this 
quicksand) sets a dubious foundation for the success of reform efforts: since ‘these employers felt they 
were at risk of litigation there was little motivation to change their working practices because they 
believed that working informally maintained better working relationships with staff and ensured 
managerial autonomy’.129 The adage regarding to where good intentions lead comes to mind.   
 
SMEs seek free, bespoke materials readily accessible at any point in time and the Coalition vindicated 
this desire with its reforms. There is cause for pessimism that these changes will have the desired 
effect.130 Only 9% of SMEs sought advice from lawyers. Younger businesses (0-3 years of existence) 
were more likely to seek out advice or information (64%). Micros (1-9 employees) were most likely to 
not know where to go for advice or information. Most of those seeking advice or information desired 
financial advice on the running of the business (23%) or business plans or strategy (22%). Only 8% 
identified employment law/redundancy as a reason for seeking external assistance. As opposed to 
purchasing advice, SMEs are increasingly relying on mentors,131 underlining the no-cost version of 
advice. 
 
Cost-sharing seems to be the Government’s next step. What SMEs may not know is that this plan 
involves them. Regional Mediation Pilot schemes in Cambridge and Manchester trained a group of 
employees from twenty-four SMEs to be mediators in order to help to resolve workplace disputes in the 
future.132 SMEs have been asked to band together to solve workplace issues. Creating a pool of mediators 
who will service an area appears to be the goal. When will these mediations occur? Will these employees 
be asked to mediate outside of work hours? Will they be paid for conducting mediations? It is unclear 
what incentive there would be for the besieged SME cohort to take employee time away from their 
businesses. 
 
The ease with which enterprises may retain and remove workers (in addition to the issue of redress) 
undervalues the importance of people being in paid work. The Bank of England has utilised the 
unemployment rate as a guide for informing its own economic policy.133 7% unemployment had been the 
target set in 2013 by the Bank before it would raise the Bank rate from .5%.134 Since that time, 
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unemployment has been on a downward trend: 7.7% in September 2013,135 6.5% in May 2014,136 6.2% in 
May-July 2014 (the lowest since late 2008)137 and 6% as of October 2014.138 While unemployment 
figures show an increase in the number of people finding work, an important fact should be identified. A 
comparison of ONS data between May-July 2008 and the same period in 2013 shows that 328,000 more 
people were employed in 2013 than 2008.139 Much of the increase can be attributed to part-time 
employment being more available than full-time work: a jump from 689,000 individuals in part-time 
employment in this period in 2008 to 1.45 million in 2013. The 7% unemployment figure that was 
identified as a threshold in 2013 has been a difficult one to pin down. For example, it does not factor in 
the type of employment. All forms of employment effect a decrease in unemployment. The type of work, 
however, should matter because regulation which facilitates the ‘plugging in’ of workers when needed 
and ‘unplugging’ them when not falls short of meeting anything more than a superficial target prone to 
perpetual fluctuation. A constant flow of new entry workers to unemployment after short periods of work 
leaves unemployment figures in constant peril, if a certain threshold of unemployment is viewed as a 
minimum for Bank action. At its essence, this form of employment regulation views English workers 
simply as a workforce to be accessed when needed. It leaves people in a continual search for secure work. 
The Bank of England noted that labour costs ‘per unit of output were currently rising by only around 1% 
per year, considerably weaker than was consistent with the inflation target in the long run’.140 
Vulnerability persists when it comes to the ability of workers to face shocks to income and interest 
rates.141 Wages have fallen about a tenth since the economic crisis began (a fall not seen in the country 
since the 1920s).142 Government policy facilitating the easy increase of unemployment numbers may not 
be one supporting sustainable economic recovery. Overall, as a way of putting people to work, the 
procedural reforms remain curious because they facilitate greater ease in dismissing workers and 
deterring associated claims against employers.  
 
(a) Authoring the definitive narrative 
The Coalition package of labour law reforms betrays an unproductive attitude.143 Commenting on the 
2008 amendments of the Labour Government, Sanders characterised them as ‘the start of a new era in 
unfair dismissal law in which “economic prosperity” dominates “social justice” to a degree not seen 
before.’144 With the Coalition changes, labour law has become just a resource for economic recovery.   
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The long-term implication of this troublingly negative rhetoric about workers is a perpetual call for 
employment regulation reform which supports economic growth.145 While not official Government 
policy, Sir Adrian Beecroft’s report speaks to the economic imperative directly. He wrote that the impact 
of employment reform would be widespread – ‘an instant improvement in performance in a significant 
part of the national workforce’.146 He went further to claim that reform is badly needed because only then 
would the onus be placed on workers to  
perform well enough for the employer to value them as workers. It would no longer be 
possible to coast along, underperforming in a way that is damaging to the enterprise 
concerned but not bad enough for the employer to want to undertake the whole rigmarole 
of the unfair dismissal process with its attendant threats of tribunals and discrimination 
charges.147  
Consider that the Prime Minister commissioned Lord Beecroft’s report. This unrelentingly negative 
perception about the English workforce informs Government policy. If the dominant view of workers 
remains one of widespread lethargy, it would appear that the problem moves beyond employment 
regulation to something more pervasive requiring attitudinal change. It remains a challenge to see how 
this situation could be entirely attributable to employment regulation alone, if at all.148 Furthermore, it 
appears as though the rhetoric has outpaced the reality. Part of the argument for toughening employment 
tribunal access is that ‘many claimants who have unfortunately not found a new job have time on their 
hands and view a free employment tribunal as a no cost option on winning an award.’149 A study 
commissioned by BIS suggested there was little to support such assertions. Only 7% of claimants had 
previously made a claim.150 72% of claimants were employed at the time researchers interviewed them.151 
58% of those who had been in work at the time of both launching a claim and interview for the study 
were earning a similar level to that made before the claim.152 In fact, 13% were working for the same 
employer at the time of their claim.153  
 
Still, the Coalition links Employment Tribunal reforms with economic growth. To effect this 
development, emphasis is placed on cutting employment costs such as those related to claims brought by 
workers or former workers: ‘The risk is that the fear of being faced with tribunal claims impedes growth 
because businesses become too cautious to hire people or to address capability issues in the workforce’.154 
The current plan takes a singular approach: if claims arise, they should be disposed of before employers 
are to expend any financial resources.  
 
IV. Conclusion 
Duress forms a common theme between the disintegration of collective labour law and the diminution of 
individual employment protections. The concept of duress was used to connect economic stagnation with 
employment regulation. Legislation and policy have been utilised to correct this problem. The question as 
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to the actual coercive force of any worker towards her employer chips away at the premise of 
contemporary government’s motivations. It cannot be maintained that now workers who face significant 
hurdles in even bringing forward an employment rights claim may exert duress on enterprises, and 
therefore the economy. The unfortunate conclusion that one comes to is that English labour law reforms 
have aimed to reverse the practical effect of employment protections by organic dissuasion; that is, 
placing obstacles in the way of bringing a claim forward (despite its merits). 
 
Inevitably, the labour law community returns to the same question: what is labour law about? Recent 
reforms to access to employment tribunals and the correlating ‘disincentives’ to bringing a claim impinge 
upon another central tenet, dispute resolution. The lopsided nature of the present system poses a serious 
question about not only access but also the future of labour law. The disintegration of employment 
regulation as offering protection to a full range of workers presaged the reconfiguration of access to 
dispute resolution. These are by-products of viewing labour law as a support to economic growth. The 
rising force of the adverse attitude towards employment regulation (and perhaps even talk of enforcing 
rights) is the most dangerous challenge to access to rights redress.  
